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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,

••

Plaintiff-Respondent,

••

-v-

••

THOMAS GARCIA,

Case No. 18126

••

Defendant-Appellant.

••

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant, Thomas Garcia, was charged with
second-degree murder, a first-degree felony, in violation of
Utah. Code· Ann.,:·§ 76-5-203 ( 1973), as amended, and was tried
before a jury in the Third Judicial District Court in and for
Salt Lake County, the Honorable Peter F. Leary presiding.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The jury found appellant guilty of second-degree
murder, and the trial court sentenced him to an indeterminate
term in the Utah State Prison of not less than five years, and
which may be for life.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmance of appellant's
convict ion and. sentence.
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Ryan Nielsen, a University of Utah police officer,
finished his work shift at 2:00 a.m. on March 15, 1981 (T. 2,
3).

Driving home in his personal car, Officer Nielsen

proceeded westbound along Sunnyside Avenue to 1400 East where
he noticed a yellow vehicle parked on the south side of the
street underneath a street light (T. 3, 4).

As he passed the

car, Officer Nielsen noticed three persons standing nearby,
one of whom was not wearing a shirt (T. 4).

Becoming

suspicious, Officer Nielsen executed a u-turn and proceeded
eastbound along Sunnyside Avenue whereupon he saw the
appellant, whose hands were covered with blood, dragging a
body from the car (T. 5, 6).

The officer again executed a

U-turn, and as he proceeded westbound, passing the yellow car
a third time, he observed appellant placing the body on the
ground (T. 6, 7).
Officer Nielsen then drove to a 7-11.store located
at 800 South and 1300 East where he encountered the store
manager as he was sweeping the parking lot (T. 11).

Not

leaving his car, the officer told the manager that he needed
help and asked him to call the police (T. 11).

At this

instant the yellow car containing appellant drove by the 7-11
store headed westbound along 800 South, and Officer Nielsen
left the parking lot and followed the car from a distance of
100 feet (T. 11, 12).

The car stopped at about 500 East and
-2-
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800 south and all three occupants got out (T. 12).

Officer

Nielsen then left his car, approached the three occupants,
identified himself as a police officer and ordered them to lie
on the ground (T. 11, 12).

All three complied with the order,

but moments later appellant jumped up and ran off (T. 13).
Officer Nielsen gave chase, apprehending the appellant two
blocks away following a brief struggle (T. 13).
Evidence adduced at trial indicates that the victim,
Samuel Beare, was a temporary guest at an apartment located at
269 Kelsey Avenue that was currently occupied by Mary Holloway
and Charles Crick (T. 139, 140).

On the evening of March 14,

1981,. Mary Holloway, Charles Crick, the victim and the
appellant were present at the Kelsey Avenue apartment.
Apparently

~ngered

by the victim's mistreatment of a dog in

the apartment,· the appellant threatened the victim, and when
the mistreatment continued, he hit the victim, knocking him to
the floor (T. 117).

In this position, the appellant continued

his assault, joined by Mary Holloway and Charles Crick, that
resulted in the victim's death (T. 116-118).
At trial, Dr. Guery Flores, a forensic pathologist,
testified. that the victim's face had sustained numerous
contusions and lacerations (T. 61).

In addition, he found

fifteen stab wounds on the victim's body, thirteen wounds to
the thorax and two wounds to the abdomen (T. 61, 62).

Each

wound was about six inches deep and each wound could have
caused death (T. 62, 66).
-3Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
RESPONDENT PRESENTED SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE
AT TRIAL TO SUPPORT APPELLANT'S
CONVICTION.
Appellant argues that no evidence exists linking him
to the victim's death, and thus.his guilty verdict for seconddegree murder is supported by a quantum of evidence that is
insufficient as a matter of law.

Therefore, the appellant

concludes, a reversal of his conviction is mandated.
When faced with an insufficiency of evidence claim,
this Court accords great deference to conclusions reached by
the jury in matters solely within its province:
It is the exclusive function of the jury
to weigh the evidence and to determine the
credibility of the witnesses, and it is
not within the prerogative of this Court
to substitute its judgment for that of the
factfinder. This Court should only
interfere when the evidence is so lacking
and insubstantial that reasonable men
could not possibly have reached a verdict
beyond a reasonable doubt.
State v. Lamm, Utah, 606 P.2d 229, 231 (1980) (emphasis
added).

Thus, this Court's function is not to determine guilt

or innocence, the weight to give conflicting evidence, or the
credibility of witnesses.

State v. Lamm, supra: State v.

Gorlick, Utah, 605 P.2d 761 (1979).

In State v. Logan, Utah,

563 P.2d 811, 814 (1977), this Court recast its review
-4-
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standard in rather succinct terms:

"[U]nless there is a clear

showing of lack of evidence, the jury verdict will be upheld."
Furthermore, this Court has stated that its review of the
evidence and those inferences reasonably deduced therefrom
will be conducted in the light most favorable to the jury
verdict.

State v. Kerekes, Utah, 622 P.2d 1161, 1168 (1980).

In addition, the defendant bears the burden of establishing
that the evidence presented at his trial was so inconclusive
arrl insubstantial that reasonable minds must have entertained

a reasonable doubt concerning his guilt for the crime charged.
Id. at 1168.
Those.· facts marshalled by appellant in his brief and
his cons.tr.uction of those facts simply fail to cast doubt on
the appropriateness of his guilty verdict for second-degree
murder.

Quite to the contrary, the lower court record

contains overwhelming evidence pointing to his participation
in the murder.

Indeed, those facts in the record and
/'

reasonable inferences deduced therefrom would convince a
reasonable person beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant was
guilty of second-degree murder.
A brief review of the evidence reveals the
following:

It is undisputed that on March 14, 1981,

appellant, angered by the victim's treatment of a dog, hit him
with his fist and knocked him to the floor (T. 117).

While

the victim was in this condition, the appellant continued

-sSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the beating and was later joined by Mary Holloway and Charles
Crick (T. 117, 118).

Later, in the early morning hours of

March 15, 1981, appellant was seen dragging the body of the
victim from a car, his hands and body covered with blood (T.
4-6).

During trial, the forensic pathologist testified that

fifteen knife wounds had been inflicted on the victim's thorax
and abdomen, each wound fatal (T. 61, 62, 66). He further
testified that the wounds were inflicted at different angles,
indicating that the victim either moved during the attack or
the assailant moved around the victim's body as the attack
progressed

(T.

63).

The latter inference is more reasonable

in light of the earlier vicious beating that must have
incapacitated the victim, and in light of other testimony
presented by the pathologist that the victim's blood contained
high concentrations of alcohol and other sedative and hypnotic
drugs (T. 117, 118, 69, 70).

Thus, the reasonable inference

is that the victim remained motionless while the assailant
moved around the body stabbing at will.

Note, however, that a

multiple party attack with one knife, each member stabbing the
victim in turn, would be consistent with this result and would
explain the variety of wounds, each with a different angle.
Furthermore, this explanation is all the more reasonable when
it is remembered that the initial beating of the victim was
conducted jointly by the appellant and his two accomplices.
-6-
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On March 15, 1981, a knife covered with blood was
found at about 800 South 1200 East, a location adjacent to the
route appellant took after the victim's body had been dropped
(T. 104, 88).

In addition, the appellant had admitted owning

a knife (T. 119).

Further examination and analysis of the

knife·revealed that the blood found thereon was consistent
with blood removed from the victim (T, 89), and that the knife
could have caused the wounds inflicted on his body (T. 62,
63).

On March 23, 1981, the Kelsey Avenue apartment was
searched, revealing a mattress soaked in blood and nearby
walls spotted with blood (T. 80, 81).

Samples from the

mattress and wall were removed (T. 80, 81).

Later analysis

showed that the chemical characteristics of the blood removed
from the mattress were consistent with characteristics of the
victim's blood and that the blood found on the wall was
consistent with the appellant's blood (T. 90, 91, 81, 93).
Utah Code Ann.,

§

76-5-203(1) (1973), as amended,

states in part:
Criminal homicide constitutes murder
in the second degree if the actor:
(a) Intentionally or knowingly causes
the death of another~ or
(b) Intending to cause serious bodily
injury to another, he commits an act
clearly dangerous to human life that
causes the death of another~ or
(c) Acting under circumstances
evidencing a depraved indifference to
-7-
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human life, he engages in conduct which
creates a grave risk of death to another
and thereby causes the death of another.
• • •

Clearly, as a minimum, appellant's conduct falls within the
ambit of§ 76-5-203(l)(b), supra.

The evidence summarized

above shows that appellant attacked the victim intending to
cause at least serious bodily injury.

The nature and extent

of the victim's facial wounds are conclusive on that issue.
Next, the evidence supports a reasonable inference that
appellant, in concert with the others, stabbed the victim,
opening wounds that were separately fatal.

Certainly this

would be deemed an act clearly dangerous to human life and
which caused the death of the victim.
In sum, appellant has not carried his burden of
demonstrating the insufficiency and inconclusiveness of the
evidence.

To the contrary, the evidence presented by

respondent, together with reasonable inferences deduced
therefrom, would compel a reasonable person to conclude that
/

appellant was guilty of second-degree murder.

Therefore,

appellant cannot prevail on this claim.
POINT II
ADMISSION OF PHOTOGRAPHS OF THE VICTIM WAS
NOT ABUSE OF THE TRIAL COURT'S DISCRETION.
During trial, respondent moved for the admission of
six color photographs, each depicting the victim as he was
-8-
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found at 1400 East Sunnyside Avenue (T. 34).

The trial court

admitted five of the photographs over appellant's objection to
four of them (T. 34, 35).
The appellant argues that by admitting the
photographs the trial court abused its discretion because the
photographs lacked probative value and they merely served to
inflame the passions of the jury, citing State v. Poe, 21 Utah
2d 113, 441 P.2d 512 (1968).

Poe, however, is clearly

distinguishable from the instant case.

There, the defendant

was convicted of first-degree murder and he appealed
contending, inter alia, that the lower court abused its
discretion~in

autopsy.

admitting color slides depicting the victim's

The slides depicted stages of the autopsy as parts

of the victim's skull and brain were removed.

Prior to the

admission of the color slides, black and white photographs had
been introduced showing the victim lying in bed with two
bullet wounds in his head.

In resolving the defendant's

claim, this Court adopted a balancing test:
Initially, it is within the sound
discretion of the trial court to determine
whether the inflammatory nature of such
slides is outweighed by their probative
value with respect to an issue in fact.
If the latter they may be admitted even
though gruesome.
441 P.2d at 515.

Applying this standard, this Court reversed

the defendant's conviction and remanded· his case for a new
-9-
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trial because any facts that could have been adduced from the
autopsy slides had been established by prior medical testimony
a~

thus the slides had no probative value.

441 P.2d at 515.

In the instant case the color photographs did not
depict details of the victim's autopsy that could have been
established by appropriate medical testimony.

Rather, the

photos showed the nature of the victim's wounds, the
surrounding area where the victim had been deposited, and the
depravity of the appellant's assault upon the victim.
In State v. Renzo, 21 Utah 2d 205, 443 P.2d 392
(1968), the defendant was charged with first-degree murder but
convicted of voluntary manslaughter.

The defendant appealed

his conviction contending that he had been prejudiced by the
introduction of two gruesome color pictures depicting the
murder in which sexual mutilation had also occurred.

This

Court noted that a photo of a murder victim is not per se
inadmissible because of its gruesomeness.

Rather, there nis

no reason for excluding it from evidence if it is otherwise
competent and relevant."

443 P.2d at 392.

Affirming the

defendant's conviction, this Court held that the photos were
properly admitted because they were relevant in demonstrating
a depraved mind which was required for the applicable firstdegree murder statute (Utah Code Ann.,
also:

§

76-30-3 (1953)).

See

State v. Ross, 28 Utah 2d 279, 501 P.2d 632 (1972)

(photos of the victim were properly admitted because they were
-10Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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of probative value in illustrating the nature of the attack on
the victim where malice was an issue); State v. Poe, 24 Utah
2d 355, 471 P.2d 870 (1970) (two black and white photos
depicting the victim's death by gunshot wounds were held
properly admitted for the purpose of showing the nature and
degree .of the homicide).
In the instant case, appellant was charged with
second-degree murder in violation of S 76-5-203(1).

Paragraph

(c) under that statute requires that the respondent prove
appellant acted under "circumstances evidencing a depraved
ind if fe rence to human life. • • • ft

Thus, these color photos

were probative of an issue in fact; vis., the appellant's
depraved indifference to human life.
Finally, some of the photos are valuable in
describing ·the . area at which the victim was dropped.
Particularly, these photos show the position of the victim in
relation to a sidewalk adjacent to Sunnyside Avenue and a
nearby parking lot.

Clearly, the probative value of these

pictures outweighs their inflammatory nature and thus was
properly admitted by the trial court.
POIMT III
THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR IN ITS
RECEPTION OF EVIDENCE DURING TRIAL.

Recall that the appellant fled from his car and was
apprehended two blocks away by Officer Nielsen.

The following

-11Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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testimony dealt with Officer Nielsen's effort to obtain some
assistance from passers-by:

(T. 15).

Q.

Who was present besides--

A.

Myself and Mr. Garcia and the individual that was walking down the
street.

Q.

And what did you tell this individual?

A.

I told him I was a police officer and
that I needed some help, and would he
go call the police.

Q.

There were three people present?

A.

Yes. He never stopped.
walk away.

Q.

After you made that statement to him,
did Mr. Garcia say anything?

A.

Yes, he did.

Q.

What did he say to him.

A.

Said, "I will kill you."

Continued to

Apparently, appellant's verbal threat was intended

to thwart any third party assistance that would aid in his
apprehension.

To Officer Nielsen's answer, defense counsel

raised an objection which was sustained by the trial court (T.
15).

Ap:oellant contends that this statement, "I will kill

you," was hearsay evidence that tended to paint him as a
person predisposed to commit murder, and thus in addition
violated Rules 45, 47 and 55 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
Appellant's argument, however, is built on a foundation of
-12-
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sand, for appellant attempts to assign as error to the trial
court his own defense counsel's negligence.
The form of questioning above clearly indicates that
defense counsel had sufficient time and warning to anticipate
the witness' answer and to interpose an objection to the
hearsay testimony:
Usually, in the taking of testimony of a
witness an objection is apparent as soon
as the question is asked, since the
question is likely to indicate that it
calls for inadmissible evidence. Then
counsel must, if opportunity affords,
state his objection before the witness
answers.
McCormick, Law of Evidence§ 52, at 113 (2d Ed. 1972).
Assuming arguendo that defense counsel was not afforded
sufficient opportunity to interpose a timely objection, then a
motion to strike should have been made:
In all these cases, an •after objection•
may be stated as soon as the ground
appears. The proper technique for such an
objection is to phase a motion to strike
out the objectionable ~vidence, and to
request an instruction to the jurv to
disregard the evidence.
Id.

§

52 at 113 (emphasis added).

Furthermore, "where

objection to testimony is sustained, but no motion to strike
is made, the answer becomes part of the record."

State v.

Abbey, 13 Ariz. App. 55, 474 P.2d 62, 63 n. 1 (1970).

-13-
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Here, the record contains the answer because
defense counsel failed to make a motion to strike, not because
of any error in the trial court's reception of evidence.
Thus, appellant's claim lacks merit.
CONCLUSION
Appellant's conviction for second-degree murder was
supported by sufficient evidence.

Furthermore, the photos of

the victim were properly admitted at trial because their
probative value outweighed their inflammatory effect.
Finally, the trial court committed no error in its reception
of evidence.

Therefore, respondent respectfully requests this

Court affirm appellant's conviction.
Respectfully submitted this 3rd day of November,
1982.
DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed three true and exact
copies of the foregoing Brief, postage prepaid, to John

w.

Ebert, Attorney for Appellant, Salt Lake Legal Defender
Assoc., 333 South 200 East, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111, this
3rd day of November, 1982.
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CITY,UTAH 84114 /TELEPHONE (801) 533-5261

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,

'

••

.

Plaintiff-Respondent,·

••

-v-

••

THOMAS GARCIA,

-

'

Defendant-Appellant.

Case No. 18126

..
••

SUPPLEMENT TO BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

The respondent, having heretofore filed a brief in
this matter on November 3, 1982, respectfully submits the
following Supplement to Brief of Respondent.

The following

arguments are tendered in support of the points set forth in
Respondent's brief.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
RESPONDENT PRESENTED SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE
AT TRIAL TO SUPPORT APPELLANT'S
CONVICTION.
Although the evidence presented at trial, as recited
in Respondent's brief, was clearly sufficient to support
appellant's conviction for second-degree murder under
subsection (b) of S 76-5-203(1), it was also sufficient under
subsections (a) and (c) of that statute.

Appellant's conduct,
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as established by the evidence and reasonable inferences to be
drawn therefrom, could support the conclusion that he intended
the death of Sam Beare;or acted with the awareness that his
conduct was reasonably certain.to
.
. . cause the death of the
victim.

§

76-5-203(l)(a).

Further, his conduct in beating

the victim and participating in further attacks on the victim,
I

including the infliction.of 15 stab wounds, certainly shows he
acted with depraved indifference to human life, created a
grave risk of death to the victim, and caused the victim's
death.

§

76-5-203(l)(c).

The jury was instructed on each of

the subsections of the statute and could reasonably have based
their verdict on any of the three (R. 93, 94, 96, 97).
In addition, respondent submits that it was not
necessary for the State to prove that appellant personally
inflicted all or any of the knife wounds which were determined
to be the cause of .death in order to be properly convicted of
second-degree murder.

Under Utah Code Ann., S 76-2-202 (1973

as amended), any person:

~

• • • acting with the mental state
required for the commission of an offense
who directly commits the offense, who
solicits, requests, commands, encourages,
or intentionally aids another person to
engage in conduct which constitutes an
offense shall be criminally liable as a
party for such conduct.
The jury was so instructed in this case (R. 92).
Although there is no direct evidence of how Samuel
Taylor Beare, IV, was killed, the believable circumstantial
-2-
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evidence points to the inference that appellant initiated a
fist fight with the victim which escalatea into a brutal
beating and a fatal stabbing by appellant, Charles Crick and
Mary Holloway.

There was no evidence presented at trial which

would indicate that appellant withdrew after beginning the
fight.

There was evidence that the murder weapon matched the

.

description of appellant's knife (T. 119) which he gave to
Dianna Poor, requesting that she try to find it.

The knife

was found near where the victim's body was removed from the
car and dropped on the ground by appellant (T. 5-7, 105).
Although appellant was covered with blood at the time of his
first contact with Officer Nielson,.the officer noted that he
did not notice blood on either Crick or Holloway at the time
he attempted to.apprehend them (T. 5, 10, 127-128).

Finally,

the fact that appellant had his shirt off despite the cold
weather and the fact that most of the blood was gone from the
victim's body before it was dragged out of the car and dumped
(T. 4-6, 42-43) allow the inference that the blood all over

appellant was not solely from his dragging the body out of the
car but was from his contact with the victim at the time of
the killing.

All this allows the inference that even if

appellant did not personally inflict stab wounds on the
victim, he supplied his knife to the others for that purpose
and thus intentionally aided, encouraged or instigated the
actual killing.
-3-
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A more reasonable inference remains that appellant
directly participated with the others in inflicting the
beating and the stab

woun~~·

POINT II
THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR IN ITS
RECEPTION OF EVIDENCE DURING TRIAL.

The statement by Officer Nielson relating that
appellant said "I will kill you" to a passerby who had been
requested by the officer to call the police (T. 15) was not
hearsay and did not violate Rules 45, 47 and 55 of the Utah
Rules of Evidence.

The statement was not admitted to show the

truth of the matter stated, but merely to show the statement
was made.

Thus, it was non-hearsay.
Even if it was hearsay, the statement would have

been admissible under Rule 63(12) as:
• • • a statement of the declarant's then
existing state of mind • • • when such a
mental or physical condition is in issue
or is relevant to prove or explain acts or
conduct of the declarant.
In this case, the statement was relevant to show, when
considered with appellant's flight from the point at which the
police officer first attempted to apprehend him, that
appellant's state of mind at the time of the threat to the
bystander was consistent with his being a persQn who was
-4-
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guilty of a crime and had been caught.

The statement was thus

admissible to show his .state of mind even if it was hearsay.
I.

The statement

si~~Pl.Y

does not run afoul of Rules 47

or SS of the Utah Rules of Evidence since it was not
introduced as evidence of appellant's character in general or
as evidence of some prior
wrong.

specif~¢

criminal act or civil

Rule 45 is similarly unavailing since the evidence was

relevant, as indicated above, and was not unduly prejudicial
to appellant when viewed in context with all the other
evidence adduced at trial.
Although not noted in the prior brief of Respondent,
it should be noted that the allegedly objectionable statement
was objected to immediately after it was made and the trial
court sustained the objection (T. 15).

Immediately following

this a discussion occurred at the bench; however, nothing
further was stated concerning a motion to strike or to
admonish the jury.

Another discussion as to the statement
/

occurred later in the trial in which defense counsel clarified
his objection but again made no motion to strike or for a
mistrial.

The trial court indicated he would rule on the

matter the next day of trial if he needed to (T. 45-46).
Nothing else was said after that point concerning the
statement.

Thus, respondent urges this Court

~o

find that

even if the statement should not have been admitted, appellant
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failed to preserve the issue for this appeal by

failur~

.

to

make a timely motion to strike or to admonish the jury to
disregard the statement.

-.. ..

~-

-.

Respectfully submitted ·this 7th day of December,
1982.

ROBERT N. PARRISH
Assistant Attorney General
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that I mailed three true and exact
copies of the foregoing Supplement to Brief of Respondent,
postage prepaid, to John

w.

Ebert, Attorney for Appellant,

Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc., 333 South 200 East, Salt Lake
City, Utah, 84111, this 7th day of December, 1982.
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